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1. INTRODUCTION 2
1 Introduction
The recent plethora of fraud cases involving audit firms and their clients prompts interest
in the regulation of the auditing market. The regulatory body in the UK has concentrated
on “rotation” and “fines” as deterrents to fraud. There is evidence that “rotation” in the
UK auditing market, where four firms dominate, has increased neither competition nor
choice. More importantly, recent empirical findings suggest that a fines-focused policy
may not be justified or even relevant.
We set up a game theoretic model where the decisions of the auditor and those of his client,
are independent. We posit that the auditor’s “reputation” and the financial rewards that
stem from this reputation are crucial to the decisions taken by the players.
In our auditing model, cast in the form of a game tree, a client can either offer a bribe
or not, and the auditor can either do a basic or an extensive audit. The purpose of
the analysis here is to look for equilibrium strategies. These can take the form of a Nash
equilibrium and a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The latter involves the equilibrium beliefs
of the players.
The auditing sector is highly concentrated. The same big four audit companies have
audited all but nine of the UK’s 350 largest companies in the latest available financial
year. Thus the introduction of mandatory rotation in 2016 has not been effective. The
scarcity of alternatives is compounded by the fact that auditors, given the restrictions
on what non-audit services an auditor can provide, are reluctant to give up lucrative
consulting relationships with clients in order to become their auditor.
Ideas from game theory have been employed in various studies, (Sunder, 2002, Wilks &
Zimbelman, 2004). Using the theory of common knowledge we can distinguish between
a decision approach and a game theoretic one. In the former case players follow “zero
order reasoning” (Wilks & Zimbelman, p.174); each player only looks at the conditions
that affect him and not the others and then optimizes in relation to his payoffs. In this
framework the client’s behaviour is not affected by the audit process and the approach is
deterministic (Cavusoglu and Raghunathan, 2004).
While it is reasonable to assume that in the case of an accounting mistake made by the
client, his behaviour will not be affected by the audit, it is naive to assume the same
in the case of fraud. This corresponds to the case of “higher-order reasoning” (or lat-
eral reasoning): we follow a game theory approach where the auditor’s actions impact
on the probability of a client committing fraud. In other words fraudulent behaviour be-
comes endogenous as the client’s behaviour changes in relation to the auditor’s actions.
Similarly, when assessing fraud risk, the auditor is aware of this and changes his configu-
ration/process. As a result, there is strategic interdependence as the auditor’s expectation
of the client’s action affects the latter’s action and vice versa. Hence each player’s best
response changes based on the expected best response by the other player (Fellingham
and Newman, 1985, Bloomfield, 1995, Zimbelman and Waller 1999, Coate et al., 2002,
Wilks and Zimbelman, Anastasopoulos and Anastasopoulos, 2012). It is to this latter
category of papers looking at fraud that our work belongs.
Our approach is substantially different in that we obtain results from analysing an ex-
tensive form game. We disentangle this interdependence of strategic decisions by using
backward induction, to establish the perfect Bayesian equilibria, (PBE), which is charac-
terised by consistent interdependent strategies and beliefs. As explained in the Appendix
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this concept is a stronger form of the idea of Nash equilibria (NE).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses previous literature on
auditing. Section 3 constructs the extensive form game and explains how the interdepen-
dence of decisions of the firm and his auditor results in the payoffs. Section 4 employs the
powerful concepts from game theory of Nash equilibrium and Perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium. It describes the equilibrium strategies and distinguishes between the significance of
the two ideas. Section 5 looks into the implications of alternative paths of decisions which
leads to the equilibria. Throughout “Bribe” and “Bonus” in the payoffs are equal. Section
6 analyses the more involved cases where “Bribe” and “Bonus” are not equal. Section 7
focuses on the critical payoffs for the firm and the auditor in offering and accepting (or
not) a bribe. Section 8 conveys the cornerstone concluding result that the reputation of
the auditor and his worth are instrumental in establishing equilibria with non-fraudulent
behaviour. Finally, the Appendix recalls concepts and definitions from game theory.
2 Previous findings
Fairchild (2007) argues that a long tenure allows for the building of expertise as the
auditor becomes familiar with the client’s business. This leads to a higher audit quality.2
His model considers Nash equilibria without looking at the consistency of beliefs in such
equilibria. The game he considers is a two-step one only, where neither party sees the
actions of the other. The auditor’s ability to detect fraud is taken to be a function of
time, rather than an endogenous choice resulting from interdependencies in the game. As
the probability of detection increases over time, the expected reward for revealing fraud
increases too and eventually exceeds the cost.
In contrast, our paper focuses on the case where the game between the client and the
auditor is a non-cooperative one. The auditor has already acquired expertise which he
may decide to use following his rejection of a bribe. This is made possible by constructing
an extensive form game where a subsequent move by the auditor following the client’s
actions is possible. We use the assumption that tenure with the same client leads to
developing specialisation, and hence the ability to detect fraud even in the absence of an
extensive audit.
There is wide spread agreement that a good reputation leads to higher fees and more
clients.3 Auditor reputation translates into a “bonus” payment awarded by the market.
Such auditors are preferred by the clients as it enables them to be known for seeking
credible financial reporting. Our model incorporates this bonus dimension.
On the other hand, litigation risk is believed to decrease the risk of coordination between
a client and his auditor. Legal actions initiated by affected/stakeholder parties (investors,
regulators, etc.) result to losses from compensation payments and regulator penalties, and
harm auditor reputation.4
While early empirical results provide support for this view (Farmer et al., 1987, DeAngelo,
1981), later studies conclude that high litigation risk actually lowers audit quality rather
2Beck and Wu (2006) also discuss the building of expertise as a learning by doing process described by
a recursive relation. Similarly, this is depicted by Laitinen and Laitinen (2015) as a process in which the
ability of the auditor to detect fraud increases as a result of learning.
3See Barton, 2005, Weber et al., 2008, Tepalagul and Lin, 2015, Francis et al., 2017.
4For example see the lawsuit in Florida by a trustee of the failed mortgage lender Taylor, Bean &
Whitaker, against PwC in 2016 seeking damages of $5.5 billion for failing to detect fraud.
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than increases it (DeFond and Zhang, 2014). For counties like Germany and Norway,
studies by Weber et al. (2008) and Hope and Langli (2010) find that the absence of
serious litigation risk does not make auditors less likely to issue qualified reports. Higher
quality is rewarded through the market by allowing the auditor to command higher fees.
These rewards are sufficient to induce a more ethical behaviour from the side of the auditor
without the need for a more interventionist or litigious approach.
Bigus (2011) argues that if reputation effects are sufficiently strong in a market, then
limited liability will not matter as there will be a Nash equilibrium, where the auditor
takes proper care and the affected investors do not sue. However, unlike our model which
explicitly includes penalties for fraud, his work does not consider fraud but negligence.
It is traditionally believed that an auditor “can be moved away from inappropriate be-
haviour” (Hatherly et al., 1996, Iscenko et al., 2016) through suitable amendments in the
payoffs by a regulator and the legal framework in a country, taking the form of big penal-
ties and/or damages claims by investors respectively. However, our model suggests that
this is not as important as the existence and size, in a country, of a bonus effect bestowed
as a reward for reputation to the auditor.
The studies of Germany and Norway confirm that the absence of litigation costs in some
developed countries does not adversely affect honest behaviour by the auditor. The cre-
ation of a professional ethos is more the result of the size of carrots (the market bonus of
more money and higher fees that the reputation of high quality in auditing brings) rather
than sticks. Indeed in our paper we find that while the existence of the latter is important,
penalty size is not of critical importance. Rather, what is important is the existence of
bonuses framed as market rewards for enhanced market reputation, and also how such
bonuses compare to bribes offered by clients to auditors to cover fraud.5 It is only in
developing countries, such as China, where social norms of ethical behaviour are not yet
well established, and auditors are not facing the possibility of a substantial litigation risk
that monitoring accompanied by strong sanctions is necessary. (Lisic et. al., 2015).
Our findings indicate that if the rewards from successfully uncovering fraud match the
rewards from a bribe, we then have three Nash equilibria all of which are PBE ones and
involve either Fraud or Non Fraud. If bribes exceed such rewards then the credible Nash
equilibrium that remains (in the sense of being a PBE one) is the one that involves Fraud
by the client and a bribe accepted by the auditor to cover fraud. Finally, if bonuses exceed
bribes, then there are two PBEs both of which involve Non Fraud by the client.
5The principle of stressing the importance of rewards over penalties is echoed in the recent literature
on executive compensation. Such work is based on the assumption that the manager is loss averse. Conse-
quently, compensation schemes in the form of fixed salaries with stock options are preferable in designing
incentives, given the manager’s strong asymmetric dislike for losses (de Meza and Webb, 2007). We wish
to stress that while our model does not include any behavioural assumptions of loss aversion, we similarly
find support for more bonuses using a game theoretic formulation of auditing. Bigus (2015) also argues
that even in the absence of loss averse behaviour by the auditor, reputation matters and can compensate
for the existence of limited litigation costs. However, similarly to his 2011 paper, mentioned earlier, he
considers again negligence, not fraud.
3. ANALYSIS OF GRAPHS 5
3 Analysis of graphs
3.1 The structure of the model
There are two players. P1, the client, who plays first and chooses between No Fraud (NF )
and Fraud (F ) and P2, the auditor, who follows without knowing what P1 has chosen.
Thus P2 acts under imperfect information, but with perfect recall as he has not forgotten
any information that he had before.6 From the indistinguishable nodes η1 and η2 he can
choose, in a synchronized move, to play either the pure strategy BA (basic audit) or EA
(extended audit). Also, P1, from the indistinguishable nodes η3 and η4, chooses in a
synchronized move to play either the pure strategy Bribe or No Bribe, without being able
to observe whether the auditor has chosen BA or EA.
First we look at the notation which characterizes gains, costs, bonuses and bribes.
Notation of payoffs to the client:
(i) CBA: Gain after a basic audit in the absence of fraud
(ii) CEA: Gain after an extended audit in the absence of fraud
(iii) CF : Gain from fraud
(iv) CD: Penalty if fraud is detected
(v) CBR: Cost of the bribe offered to the auditor.
Notation of payoffs to the auditor:
(i) ABR: Gain from the bribe.
(ii) ABO: Bonus to the auditor from detecting the fraud
(iii) ABA: Cost of a basic audit
(iv) AEA: Cost of extended audit
(v) AL: Cost of failing to detect the fraud.
The tree develops in two separate ways. If P1 has chosen NF the game terminates. The
outcome in terms of payoffs depends on the effort that P2 expends. P1 does not feel
the need to come back and, for example, make a money offer, i.e. to offer a bribe. If
on the other hand P1 has played F , then the game does not terminate with the effort
of P2. Instead, first P1 offers or does not offer a bribe while being ignorant as to how
determined P2 is to pursue the investigation further. So P2 is faced either with a bribe,
which he accepts or rejects, or with a no-bribe situation. If he rejects the bribe or if there
is no bribe, then in the case of BA, he will have to decide whether to pursue a deeper
investigation7 of the client. In the case of EA the fraud will have been detected from the
outset and the client will be punished unless he offers a bribe which the auditor accepts.
Below we explain how the payoffs are formed. Gains and/or losses are over and above the
basic payments between the two companies; e.g. fees paid by the client to the auditor for
his services.
6See the Appendix
7This will be denoted in the diagrams as “extra effort” or “no extra effort”.
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3.2 The calculation of payoffs of the agents
For the two agents, that is the client and the auditor, we make the following assumptions
with respect to the combination of gain, penalty, cost and bonus in calculating their
payoffs.
The calculation of payoffs of the client
(i) Gains for the client through an increase in reputation, in the absence of fraud, following
a Basic Audit, BA, where the books are found by the auditor to be in order. CBA ≥ 0.
(ii) Gains for the client through an increase in reputation, in the absence of fraud, following
an Extended Audit, EA, where the books are found by the auditor to be in order. Clearly
CEA > CBA. However as we will see below this is not a critical assumption for establishing
NE or PBE solutions.
(iii) Gains for the client if the audit fails to reveal the fraud that he has committed: CF .
The gain from fraud exceeds CEA, the gains from being found to be in the clear by an
extended audit (CF > CEA).
(iv) Value of the penalty, D, if fraud is detected by the auditor: CD < 0. We note that
if it is certain that the fraud will definitely be revealed by the market at some later stage
then CD would be, in absolute terms, larger. We assume that the penalty exceeds the
gains from fraud, i.e. CF + CD < 0.
(v) The value of the bribe (BR) if it is offered by the client and accepted by the auditor:
CBR < 0. We assume that the payment of a bribe is less than the value of the fraud and
also that this net payoff from fraud is larger than CBA, i.e. CF + CBR > CBA.
The calculation of payoffs of the Auditor
(i) The gain from the bribe, BR: ABR > 0. Obviously, ABR = −CBR.
(ii) The bonus, BO, from detecting fraud: ABO > 0.
While the bonus is awarded to an auditor by the market, the size of this award in our
model depends on the importance a society places on rewarding honest behaviour and
on framing such rewards as bonuses rather than as part of the basic payment from the
client to the auditor. We can set ABO(λ), where λ is a social parameter for a country’s
institutional environment comprising the set of social norms as we discussed in section 2.
We examine separately the cases where ABR = ABO, ABR > ABO and ABR < ABO.
Whether the bonus is equal to (or exceeds) the bribe, rather than the latter strictly
exceeding the former, is crucial for non-fraudulent behaviour, NF , to be a credible, PBE
equilibrium. In other words, the existence of carrots and their magnitude is critical to
induce ethical behaviour. This bonus is reflected in the form of enhanced reputation
which commands higher fees.
(iii) Cost to the auditor of a basic audit, BA: ABA < 0. Also, ABA +ABR > 0.
(iv) Cost to the auditor of an extended audit, EA: AEA < 0. Clearly |AEA| > |ABA|.
(v) Cost to the auditor of not detecting fraud through a loss, AL < 0.
The size of AL could include litigation costs from failing to uncover fraud. Legal actions
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can be initiated by affected/stakeholder parties (investors, regulators, etc.). There is also
the loss of fees from lost clients. We note that it is not certain that the fraud will eventually
be uncovered by the regulator or other stakeholders. The inclusion of the cost AL in our
model is made simply to allow for such a possibility, which the auditor should bear in mind
taking into account other cases in the past. We will return to this point in our analysis
below.
3.3 The overall calculation of payoffs
From the above discussion, we have the following rules for the calculation of payoffs cor-
responding to the choices8 of the agents:
–P1 plays “NF” and P2 plays “BA”; the books are found to be in order: Player P1 gets
CBA and P2 gets ABA.
–P1 plays “NF” and P2 plays “EA”: Player P1 gets CEA and P2 gets AEA.
–P1 plays “F, Bribe” and P2 plays “BA, Reject, Ex”.
The payoff for the client is the sum of the gain from fraud and the cost of detection, i.e.
CF+CD. The auditor who is experienced rejects the bribe offered after a basic audit and
through a deeper investigation he detects the fraud. The payoff P2 obtains is ABO+ABA;
he gets a bonus for detecting the fraud following the fact that he expended effort ABA.
–P1 plays “F, Bribe” and P2 plays “BA, Reject, NEx”.
The auditor applies basic audit and fails to detect the fraud. The payoff of P1 from the
fraud is CF . The auditor here receives ABA, reflecting the basic audit expended effort
and also suffers reputation loss, i.e. he receives payoff ABA +AL.
–P1 plays “F, Bribe” and P2 plays “BA, Accept,.”.
P1 retains the value from the fraud and pays a bribe, i.e. CF +CBR. The auditor plays
basic audit and accepts the bribe, with payoff ABA+ABR.
–P1 plays “F, No Bribe” and P2 plays “BA,.,Ex”.
The client gains from fraud CF , but because of a deeper investigation performed by an
experienced auditor his fraud is detected and he has to pay the penalty CD, i.e. he
receives CF+CD. The auditor receives a payoff of ABO for detecting the fraud through a
deeper investigation, while ABA reflects his cost of the basic audit, i.e. he receives payoff
ABA+ABO.
–P1 plays “F, No Bribe” and P2 plays “BA, ., NEx”.
The client gains from the fraud CF and this is not detected by the auditor. The auditor
expends effort ABA and also suffers loss of reputation AL i.e. he receives payoff ABA+AL.
–P1 plays “F, Bribe” and P2 “EA, Reject,.”.
The client gains from the fraud CF but, because of the extended audit the fraud has been
detected and reported by the auditor and he has to pay a penalty CD; i.e. he receives
payoff CF + CD.
The auditor expends AEA and gains a bonus ABO for detecting the fraud through an
extended audit; i.e. he receives payoff AEA +ABO.
–P1 plays “F, Bribe” and P2 “EA, Accept, .”.
The client gains from the fraud CF and he has to pay a bribe CBR; i.e. he receives payoff
8If in the description of strategies there is a “.”, this follows the convention that any alternative pure
strategy available at that point can be placed in that position.
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CF + CBR.
The auditor gets a bribe ABR and he has an extended audit cost AEA; i.e. he receives
payoff ABR +AEA.
–P1 plays “F, No Bribe” and P2 plays “EA, ., .”.
The client gains from the fraud CF but the fraud is detected by the auditor leading to a
fine CD; i.e. he receives payoff CF + CD.
The auditor gains because he gets a bonus ABO but has to expend AEA; i.e. he receives
payoff AEA +ABO.
4 Looking for NE and PBE
In this section we consider the case where for the auditor the payoff from the bribe is equal
to the bonus, i.e. ABR = ABO. We are looking for the existence of pure strategy equilibria
and PBEs. For a pure strategy a player must declare his choice at every information set at
which he is to act. We describe three pure strategy equilibria in Figure 1 and in Figures 2
and 3 we begin the explanation of backward induction of optimal strategies in obtaining
the solutions. Further issues concerning equilibria are also analysed in the next section.
The first pure Nash equilibrium (NE) is shown through the heavy black lines. P1, when
he is to act and depending on his position, plays “F, Bribe”. P2, when he is to act, plays
“BA, Accept and Ex”. The payoffs of the two players are (CF + CBR, ABA +ABR).
We now check that these strategies form a NE. Suppose P1 plays “F, Bribe”, which is
taken as fixed. If P2 switches to “EA” then he cannot increase his payoff. Neither can he
retain “BA” and change the rest of his strategy and improve his payoff.
Next suppose that P2 plays “BA, Accept and Ex”, which is taken as fixed. First P1 cannot
switch to “NF” and improve his payoff.
Neither can P1 change to “No Bribe” and improve his payoff. Hence the pair of strategies
“F, Bribe; BA, Accept and Ex” form a NE.
The second pure NE is shown through the heavy interrupted lines. P1, when he is to
act and depending on his position, plays “NF, Bribe”. P2, when he is to act, plays “BA,
Reject and Ex”. The payoffs of the two players are (CBA, ABA).
We now check that these strategies form a NE. Suppose P1 plays “NF, Bribe”, which is
taken as fixed. If P2 switches to “EA” then he cannot increase his payoff.
Next suppose that P2 plays “BA, Reject and Ex”, which is taken as fixed. First P1 cannot
switch to “F” or to “F, No Bribe” and improve his payoff.
With respect to the corresponding PBE, in the first case, player P2 believes that he is
with probability 1 at node η2 and P1 that he is at η3 with probability 1. Furthermore
the optimality condition of the decisions from the single nodes is also satisfied as a PBE
requires.
With respect to the corresponding PBE in the second case, player P2 believes that he is
with probability 1 at node η1 and P1 can assign arbitrary beliefs to the nodes in I1 because
the optimal path does not visit this information set. He might as well assign probability
1 to node η3.
We follow a similar approach for the third case where P1 plays “NF, No Bribe” and
P2 plays “BA, Reject, Ex”. The payoffs of the two players are as in the second case,
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P1
I2
P1
P2
P2
BA
No Bribe
Bribe
Accept
Ex
η3
η2
η4
Reject Accept
EA
NF
NEx
F
A pure strategy NE:1st:
(NF, Bribe; BA, Reject, Ex)
This can also can be traced on the graph.
(NF, No Bribe; BA, Reject, Ex)
3rd:
2nd:
(F, Bribe; BA, Accept, Ex)
(Shown on the graph by the bold lines)
(Shown on the graph by the dotted lines)
ABA+AB0
CF+CD CF
ABA+AL
CF+CBR
ABA+ABR
CF+CD
CF
ABA+ALABA+AB0
CF+CD
AEA+AB0
CF+CBR
AEA+ABR
Another pure NE is also:
No Bribe
AEA+ABO
CF+CD
I1
P2 η1
Bribe
P2
EABA
Reject
Ex NEx
CBA
ABA
CEA
AEA
A pure NE:
All three Nash equilibria are also perfect Bayesian equilibria
Figure 1
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(CBA, ABA) and it is easy to show that these two strategies are also both NE and PBE.
This third NE can also be traced by looking at Figure 1.
In considering the various strategies we could for the lower part of the tree expand the
notation by attaching an index indicating the point, the subgame, from which the decision
is taken. That would rather complicate matters and in any case in folding up the tree
through the subgames no information is lost.
There are 32 possible combinations of pairs of strategies of the two players. The issue is
now to consider together all available pairs and see whether they form an equilibrium.
-First, any pair (NF, .; EA, ., .) is not a NE, as P2 can switch to “BA, ., .” and improve
his payoff. Next any pair (F, .; EA, ., .) is also not a NE. Player P2 can switch to “BA,
., .” and improve his payoff. Hence EA is a dominated strategy. This takes care of all
developments of the tree from “EA”.
We next look at the combinations which are left to be considered for a possible NE. In
the first instance we consider the various strategies which involve BA and see whether a
combination with “NF,.” from the side of P1 will do. We have (i) “BA, Reject, Ex”; (ii)
“BA, Reject, NEx”; (iii) “BA, Accept, Ex”; (iv) ”BA, Accept, NEx”. We combine each
with “NF, .” and examine what happens.
We have the pairs:
-(NF, .; BA, Reject, Ex) are both NE, both with payoffs (CBA, ABA) as discussed above.
-All (NF,.; BA, Reject, NEx) can not be Nash because P1 can switch to “F, No Bribe”
and increase his payoff from CBA to CF .
-Also all (NF,.; BA, Accept, .) can not be Nash because P1 can increase his payoff by
switching to “F, Bribe” from CBA to CF + CBR.
Next we consider the combinations with “F,.”. We recall that as we have found above (F,
Bribe; BA, Accept, Ex) is a pure NE with payoffs (CF + CBR, ABA +ABR). We need to
consider the various strategies that involve “F, ” from the side of P1.
We have the pairs:
-All (F, .; BA, Reject, Ex) can not be NE because P1 can switch to “NF,.” and increase
his payoff from CF + CD to CBA.
-(F, Bribe; BA, Reject, NEx) can not be NE because P2 can switch to“BA, Reject, Ex”
and increase his payoff from ABA + AL to ABA + ABR. The preference of the strategy
“Ex” by P2 does not depend on the actual size of ABR as AL is negative.
-(F, No Bribe; BA, Accept, Ex). This is not NE. P1 can switch to “NF, .”and increase
his payoff from CF + CD to CBA.
-(F, Bribe, BA, Accept, NEx) is not a NE as P1 can switch to “F, No Bribe” and increase
his payoff from CF + CBR to CF .
-All (F, No Bribe; BA, ., NEx) can not be NE because P2 can switch to “BA, ,., Ex” and
increase his payoff from ABA + AL to ABA + ABO. The preference of the strategy “Ex”
by P2 does not depend on the actual size of ABO as AL is negative.
We have concluded above that there exist three pure strategies NE. We want to see which
of these form a PBE and if possible which are the most reasonable to prevail.
We reduce the tree through backward induction on the optimal strategies. We consider
the optimal choices (best strategies) of P2 at the single nodes information sets. This way
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no PBE can be lost. We start from Figure 1 ignoring the heavy black lines. A first step in
the folding up process is shown in Figure 2. We note that the moves through the choices
are unique and unambiguous.
On the other hand, when we fold up from Figure 2 every time P2 has to choose, he can
play either “Reject” or “Accept” because in both cases he gets the same payoff, that is
ABA +ABO = ABA +ABR in one case and AEA +ABO = AEA +ABR in the other. This
indifference in payoffs for P2 will show up in different formulations of the final version of
the tree.
One formulation is in the upper part of Figure 3. Suppose we start with this graph and
we forget about the past moves.
P1 has played F and in I1 he acts again. We look at I1. If P1 has arrived there, then
Bribe is better for him (dominates) than No-Bribe. So P1 offers Bribe and we go, through
backward induction, to the right hand side of the lower graph . P1 plays F and we have
the beginning of a NE. We return to Figure 3 below.
5 Discussion of the theoretical results and choice of NE
In this section we continue with the case of ABR = ABO. The NEs and the PBEs are
obtained in Figures 3 to 6 through backward induction. In folding up the game tree, we
consider the possible alternative choices of P2.
We have obtained the following NE with corresponding payoff pairs for players P1 and
P2:
(F, Bribe; BA, Accept, Ex), with payoffs pair (CF +CBR, ABA +ABR).
(NF, Bribe; BA, Reject, Ex), with payoffs pair (CBA, ABA).
(NF, No Bribe; BA, Reject, Ex), with payoffs pair (CBA, ABA).
As we have shown all of the NE can also be captured as PBEs. When the corresponding
directed optimal path of a NE goes through a particular information set the node it visits
is believed with probability 1. If there is also another node in the same information set
then it carries probability (belief) 0.
In Figure 3 we capture the beginning of NE. P2 has chosen to play “Accept” from the left-
hand-side and also “Accept” from the right-hand-side subgame in Figure 2. The choices
“F” and “BA” give the beginning of the NE: (F, Bribe; BA, Accept, Ex) with payoffs
(CF + CBR, ABA +ABR).
In Figure 4 P2 has chosen to play “Reject” from the left-hand-side and also “Reject” from
the right-hand-side subgame in Figure 2. For optimality P1 can either play “No Bribe”
or “Bribe”. These choices lead to the corresponding NE: (NF, No Bribe; BA, Reject, Ex)
and (NF, Bribe; BA, Reject, Ex) both with payoffs pair (CBA, ABA).
In Figure 5 P2 has chosen to play “Reject” from the left-hand-side and “Accept” from the
right-hand-side subgame in Figure 2. For P1 the strategy “Bribe” dominates “No Bribe”
and this leads to the lower part of the graph in Figure 5. The choices “NF” and “BA” give
the beginning of a NE. Retracing the previous steps of backward induction we confirm the
NE: (NF, Bribe; BA, Reject, Ex) with payoffs pair (CBA, ABA).
In Figure 6 P2 has chosen to play “Accept” from the left-hand-side and “Reject” from the
right-hand-side subgame in Figure 2. For P1 the strategy “Bribe” dominates “No Bribe”
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We shall look at the implications.
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The interrupted lines imply an alternative move that could be made.
Figure 2
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“NF” and “BA” is not NE, “NF” and “EA”is not NE,
P1 plays “Bribe” which dominates “No Bribe”.
The game continues to the NE: (F, Bribe; BA, Accept, Ex).
and from the right-hand-side also “Accept”.
In Figure 2 player P2 chooses from the left-hand-side singleton “ Accept”,
Figure 3
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For optimality, P1 can choose either ‘‘No Bribe’’ or ‘‘Bribe’’.
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In Figure 2, player P2 chooses from the left-hand-side singleton “Reject”,
“F” and “BA” is not NE, “F” and “EA” is not NE.
The games continues to the NE: (NF, Bribe: BA, Reject, Ex).
“NF” and “BA” is NE, “NF” and “EA” is not NE,
Under the assumption that P1 plays “Bribe”:
“NF” and “BA” starts NE, “NF” and “EA” is not NE,
“F” and “BA” is not NE, “F” and “EA” is not NE.
The games continues to the NE: (NF, No Bribe: BA, Reject, Ex).
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Figure 4
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and from the right-hand-side “Accept”.
P1 plays “Bribe” which dominates “No Bribe”.
“NF” and “BA” start a NE, “NF” and “EA” is not a NE,
“F” and “BA” is not a NE, “F” and “EA” is not a NE,
The games continues to the NE: (NF, Bribe; BA, Reject, Ex).
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In Figure 2, player P2 chooses from the left-hand-side singleton “Reject”,
Figure 5
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The game continues to NE: (NF, Bribe; BA, Reject, Ex).
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Figure 6
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and this leads to the lower part of the graph in Figure 6. The choices “NF” and “BA” give
the beginning of a NE. Retracing the previous steps of backward induction we confirm the
NE: (NF, Bribe; BA, Reject, Ex) with payoffs pair (CBA, ABA).
The real question that arises concerns the most likely NE (PBE) to prevail. The NE is a
technical definition and here it is satisfied by alternative strategy profiles. On the other
hand the payoffs pair (CF + CBR, ABA +ABR) dominated strictly the pair (CBA, ABA).
The most likely NE to prevail is (F, Bribe; BA, Accept, Ex), with payoffs pair
(CF + CBR, ABA +ABR). Although they are in a non-cooperative game, the players will
realise, having common knowledge of its structure, that at least in the long run they
themselves and their opponent will form (F, Bribe; BA, Accept, Ex), with payoffs pair
(CF + CBR, ABA +ABR).
The model implies that the most likely practice is that a firm will attempt deception,
unlawful tactics and be ready to offer a bribe. On the other hand the auditor, will confine
himself to a basic audit and accept the bribe. Both players confine themselves to looking
after their own interests. We note that in the above discussion of establishing NE and
PBEs the assumption CEA > CBA has not been used. The same applies for the actual
size of the negative payoff AL.
6 The relation between the “Bribe” and the “Bonus”
In the previous section we considered the case where the payoff from a Bribe was equal to
that of the Bonus. We next turn our attention to the case where these two fundamentals
are not equal. As mentioned in section 3, we can formulate the bonus as ABO(λ), where
λ is a society parameter that reveals the importance of the existence of honest behaviour
in a country. Clearly different societies assign different importance to honest behaviour.
The bonus in our model is not connected directly to the personal ability of an auditor. It
is determined by the socioeconomic norms in a society. So it is important to analyze the
equilibria when the bonus is small and when it is large as compared to the bribes on offer.
6.1 The Bribe is larger than the Bonus.
First we consider the sub-case where ABR > ABO. This case is analyzed in Figure 7. We
first examine the strategy (F, Bribe; BA, Accept, Ex). This is a pure NE with payoffs
(CF +CBR, ABA+ABR). Suppose P1 plays “F, Bribe”, which is taken as fixed. Then if P2
switches to “EA” he can not increase his payoff as AEA+ABR < ABA+ABR. Neither can
he retain “BA” and change the rest of his strategy and improve his payoff. Next suppose
that P2 plays “BA, Accept, Ex” which is taken as fixed. P1 can not switch to “NF” and
improve his payoff as CBA is less than CF + CBR.
We next show that (F, Bribe; BA, Accept, Ex) is a PBE using backward induction. Using
Figure 7 we first fold for P2 having chosen to play “Accept, Ex” from the left hand side
and also from the right hand side subgame as ABA + ABR > ABA + ABO > ABA + AL
and AEA +ABR > AEA +ABO correspondingly. This results to the upper tree in Figure
8. In the next stage P1 will choose to play “Bribe” from both the left hand side and the
right hand side as CF + CBR > CF + CD. This results to the lower tree on the left hand
side in Figure 8. Finally, in the following stage P2 will play “BA” both on the left hand
side subgame where P1 plays “NF” as well as on the right hand side subgame where P1
plays “F”, as both ABA > AEA and ABA + ABR > ABA +ABO. Finally P1 plays “F” as
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CF + CBR > CBA.
We now return to Figure 7 and analyse alternative pure NE for this case. The strategies
(NF, Bribe; BA, Reject, Ex) and (NF, No Bribe; BA, Reject, Ex) are both NEs with
payoffs (CBA, ABA). For the first strategy given that P2 plays “BA, Reject, Ex”, P1 can
not improve his payoff by playing “No Bribe”, nor can it improve his payoff by keeping
“Bribe” and playing “F” as CF + CD < CBA. Given that P1 plays “NF, Bribe”, P2 can
not improve his payoff neither by playing “EA” instead of “BA”, nor by retaining “BA”
and playing “Accept”.
For the second strategy (NF, No Bribe; BA, Reject, Ex), given that P1 plays “NF, No
Bribe”, P2 can not improve his payoff by switching to “EA” instead of “BA”, nor by
playing “Accept”. Given that P2 plays “BA, Reject, Ex”, P1 can not improve his payoff
by playing “Bribe”, nor can it improve his payoff by keeping “No Bribe” and playing “F”.
As it is obvious from the backward induction derivation in Figure 8, none o these two
alternative NE is a PBE. At the folding up P1 plays “F” as CBR + CF > CBA. This
is because the auditor is no longer indifferent between “Reject” and “Accept” as he was
when ABR = ABO. P2 will choose “Accept” both from the left hand side and from the
right hand side subgame and this will lead to the lower part of Figure 8 as it will be
optimal for P1 to choose “Bribe”.
Hence, given his beliefs, the choice of “No Fraud” by the client is not optimal.
6.2 The Bribe is smaller than the Bonus.
Now we look at the sub-case where ABR < ABO. This case is also analyzed in Figure 7.
We first examine the strategy (NF, Bribe; BA, Reject, Ex). This is a pure NE with payoffs
(CBA, ABA). Suppose P1 plays “NF, Bribe”, which is taken as fixed. Then if P2 switches
to “EA” he can not increase his payoff as AEA < ABA. Neither can he retain “BA” and
change the rest of his strategy and improve his payoff. Next suppose that P2 plays “BA,
Reject, Ex” which is taken as fixed. P1 can not switch to “F” or “F, No Bribe” as in
both cases CF + CD < CBA.
We also examine the strategy (NF, No Bribe; BA, Reject, Ex). This is a pure NE with
payoffs (CBA, ABA). Suppose P1 plays “NF, No Bribe”, which is taken as fixed. Then if
P2 switches to “EA” he can not increase his payoff as AEA < ABA. Neither can he retain
“BA” and change the rest of his strategy and improve his payoff. Next suppose that P2
plays “BA, Reject, Ex” which is taken as fixed. P1 can not switch to “F” and improve
his payoff as CF + CD < CBA.
We next show that both (NF, Bribe; BA, Reject , Ex) and (NF, No Bribe; BA, Reject, Ex)
are PBEs using backwards induction. As shown in Figure 9 we first fold for P2 having
chosen to play “Reject, Ex” from the left hand side and also from the right hand side
subgame as ABA + ABO > ABA + ABR > ABA + AL and AEA + ABO > AEA + ABR
correspondingly. In the next stage P1 will choose to play “Bribe” or “No Bribe” from
both the left hand side and the right hand side as in both cases the payoff is CF+CD. P1 is
indifferent between playing “Bribe” or “No Bribe” as in both cases P2 will play “Reject”.
Then, in the following stage P2 will play “BA” both on the left had side subgame as well
as on the right hand side subgame as both ABA > AEA and ABA + ABO > AEA + ABO
respectively. Finally P1 plays “NF” as CBA > CF + CD.
Consequently the choice of “No Fraud” by the client is now consistent with his beliefs.
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7 The dependence of the firm’s and auditor’s strategic be-
haviours on the size of payoffs
Our model shows that if the Bribe exceeds the Bonus (ABR > ABO) three Nash equilibria
arise. Unlike the case where ABR = ABO, here the two equilibria which involve the pure
strategies ‘No Fraud’ and ‘Reject’ are decisions which are not consistent with the players’
beliefs when the latter are updated using available information. Rather it is the decision
by the auditor to accept the bribe and the decision by the client to commit fraud in light
of this that forms a PBE.
We show that what is crucial to this decision is that in backward induction the auditor
prefers to accept the bribe as the payoff that results from doing so is always larger that
the payoffs in all other subgames. Hence compared to the case where the Bribe equals the
Bonus, this is a cut off point where the auditor is no longer indifferent between accepting
or rejecting a bribe, and the client updates his beliefs given this accordingly.
The question is the range over which overall payoffs are critical to this PBE given the
domain of values for the different payoffs for the auditor and the client as set out in
Section 3. We examine this below.
(i) The domain of the values for ABR and ABO as we need:
ABA +ABR > ABA +ABO > 0 > ABA +AL.
Hence ABR > ABO is a binding restriction.
(ii) Because the auditor plays last, it is always in his interests to choose a basic audit over
an extended one, since irrespective of whether the client plays No Fraud or Fraud, the
choice of BA gives a higher payoff than EA. The inequality that ensures this is a range of
values such that
0 > ABA > AEA
(iii) The costs of bribery to the client, CBR, depends on his disposable funds and the
expected gain from the fraud, CF . The bribe that will be paid to the auditor, (i.e.
ABR = −CBR)) has an upper ceiling CF . Hence the condition is:
ABR = −CBR < CF .
Therefore we expect that large frauds will result to large bribes which are more likely to
be accepted as they exceed ABO.
We now return to the question of whether the size of the possible litigation costs and fines,
AL, matters. The answer is no because the bribe as well as the bonus take positive values
while AL < 0 reduces the overall payoffs of the auditor. We see from Figure 7 that if the
auditor is faced by a client who offers a bribe that he rejects, he will then exert sufficient
effort to detect it as ABA + ABO > 0 > ABA +AL. The perception of a possible AL cost
always moves the auditor in the direction of a thorough investigation, regardless its size.
There may be exceptions. Suppose that we add to ABA a cost c for the extra effort exerted
for uncovering a fraud after its existence is signalled by the fact that the client is offering
a bribe. If the bonus is smaller that this cost, then the size of AL may become binding. If
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AL is sufficiently close to zero, then c+ABO < AL < 0. However, the costs of uncovering
a fraud, after its existence has been revealed through the offer of bribe, will be small, so
c+ABO > AL. A small c also means that c+ABA > AEA and the auditor will still prefer
a basic audit to an extended one.
For the client to choose to play bribe, CF + CBR needs to be greater than CF + CD.
Clearly this always holds as the range of the former is positive and the range of the latter
negative.
(iv) It is required that CF+CBR is greater that the payoff CBA when he has not committed
fraud and he is found by the auditor to be in the clear following a basic audit.
Hence the inequality
CF + CBR >CBA
is binding for (F, Bribe; BA, Accept, Ex) to be a PBE when ABR > ABO.
In other words, the existence of a reputation mechanism is also relevant for the client. If it
is weak the above inequality prevails. On the other hand, if the reputation payoff for the
client, following an unqualified report, is large after a basic audit, then this may exceed
the net payoff from fraud.
As we mentioned in (ii) above, because he plays last it is always in the interests of the
auditor to choose a basic audit over an extended one, i.e. he prefers ABA to AEA. Clearly
the existence of a premium payoff, CEA > CBA, in the case where the client receives a
clean bill of health following an extended audit, plays no role as this choice between CEA
and CBA is not available to the client. This means that while it may not be observable
by the market whether the auditor chose a basic or an extended audit so that the client
is awarded with the appropriate payoff 9, this plays no role in the outcome. The decision
of which strategy to play (BA or EA) is made by the auditor, not the client.
If the Bonus exceeds the Bribe (ABO > ABR) two Nash equilibria arise. Both are PBE,
and both involve No Fraud and a Reject of the Bribe as decisions which are consistent
to the players’ beliefs as the later are updated using available information. The pair of
strategies (F, Bribe; BA, Accept, Ex) is no longer a Nash equilibrium as P2 can improve
his payoff by choosing “Reject” instead of “Accept” given P1’s strategy choice “F, Bribe”.
What is binding is:
(i) The domain of the values for ABR and ABO as we need:
ABA +ABO > ABA +ABR > 0 > ABA +AL.
Clearly given what we have mentioned in (iii) above this is more likely to be the case
either when the size of the fraud is small, in which case this lowers the upper ceiling of
ABR, and/or when reputation is very important in the economy and hence ABO is large.
However the size of penalties does not factor in as a binding restriction as AL is negative.
As mentioned above because the auditor plays last, it is always in his interests to choose a
basic audit over an extended one, since irrespective of whether the client plays No Fraud
or Fraud, the choice of BA gives a higher payoff than EA. As we have explained, now that
the Bonus exceeds the Bribe the auditor is not indifferent between accepting or rejecting
9See Knechel, 2013, p. A3-A4.
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a bribe. This time he will choose Reject, and the client updates his beliefs given this
accordingly.
Inequalities (ii) and (iii) will need to hold as above.
Interestingly, if ABR < ABO, backward induction shows that the client is indifferent
between choosing Bribe or No Bribe as the payoff in either case is CF + CD (Figure 9).
The client will always choose to play No Fraud as the payoff for doing so, CBA, exceeds
CF + CD. Clearly this always holds as the former is positive and the latter is negative.
8 Concluding remarks
The cornerstones of our model are the introduction of the concept of “auditor reputation”
and the reward ABO that comes with it depending on the country’s social norms. Our
analysis above suggests that the size of this reputational reward is critical in ensuring
ethical behaviour on both sides. The importance that society attaches to honest behaviour
is monetized in the form of the auditor’s ability to command higher client fees through
a high quality reputation. In other words, ABO, is the premium in audit fees that the
auditor commands over rivals with a lower reputation for quality. This depends on the
market’s propensity to reward higher quality and integrity in the process and outcomes
of auditing; i.e. its size depends on the “environment” in the society where the market
operates and the framing of bonuses as such.
Regarding penalties, we have found their size is not binding in establishing Nash and
PBE solutions irrespective of whether the size of the bribe to the auditor exceeds, is
equal to, or less than that of the bonus. On the other hand, CD, the penalty faced by a
client for dishonest behaviour is third party determined (e.g. set by a financial regulator)
and assumed to be greater than CF . To a large extent reporting fraud in a society is,
like the bonus, dependent on the environment in that society as regards the cultural
norms determining the willingness by companies, charities, pubic sector organisations and
whistle-blowers to uncover and report fraud.
In practice, fraud detection itself is dependent to a large extent on market participants
other than the auditors. According to Dyck et. al. (2010), it is employees, non-financial
market regulators and media that report a combined 43% of detected fraud, while au-
ditors only account for 10%, which is fractionally larger than the percent detected by
financial regulators at 7%. As discussed, if auditors fail to detect or report fraud which is
subsequently detected by others, the auditor will “pay” in terms of regulatory fines and
litigation costs as subsumed in AL.
The findings of our model yield the policy implication that it is important to try to frame
the payoffs to the auditors in the form of bonuses rather than fines. A policy which is
based on fines is not going to be as effective in ensuring honest reporting from the clients.
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Appendix: General remarks on classification of games, strate-
gies and equilibrium concepts.
We recall a few definitions and concepts. For more detailed information see, for example,
Glycopantis (2016). A finite game tree consists of (i) an initial node, (ii) a finite set of
nodes, belonging to the players’ information sets, from which action can be taken, and
(iii) a finite number of terminal nodes listing the payoffs of players. A (directed) path
takes the play of the game from the initial node to a terminal node of the tree in a unique
manner. No two paths can ever intersect. A subgame consists of a root, a node, from
which a connected set of edges follow to terminal nodes.
A pure strategy of a player maps each of his information sets into the actions available at
that set. Mixed strategies are defined to be probability distributions over pure strategies.
Behavioural strategies attach a probability distribution to the moves from each information
set; these probabilities are attached independently.
A behavioural strategy means when a player enters an information set he carries with
him a piece of paper, specific to this set, telling him that he must spin a wheel to decide
which move he will make. The wheel is the same for all nodes in this information set.
Behavioural strategies can also be mixed. A pure strategy is also a behavioural strategy.
A Nash equilibrium (NE) consists of a set of players’ strategies such that nobody can
change his strategy unilaterally, that is while everybody else keep theirs constant, and
improve his payoff. In the analysis of the graphs we obtain optimal pure strategies in the
sense of Nash.
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) consists of a set of players’ optimal behavioural
strategies, and consistent with these, a set of beliefs which attach a probability distribution
to the nodes of each information set. Consistency requires that the decision from an
information set is optimal given the particular player’s beliefs about the nodes of this set
and the strategies from all other sets. Beliefs are formed from updating, using the available
information. If the optimal play of the game enters an information set then updating of
beliefs must be Bayesian. Otherwise appropriate beliefs are assigned arbitrarily to the
nodes of the set.
A player P is said to have perfect recall if he never forgets what he once knew. A game is
said to be of perfect recall if every player has perfect recall. Otherwise the game is said to
be of of imperfect recall, (Glycopantis, 2014). It is characterized by ‘absent-mindedness’
of the players.
Games of imperfect recall are contrasted with games having imperfect information. In
the latter there is no loss of information. The nodes of an information set are simply
indistinguishable. The game in these notes is of imperfect information but of perfect
recall.
A (directed) path takes the play of the game from the initial node to a terminal node of
the tree in a unique manner. I.e. no two paths can ever intersect.
In the games examined in this paper we are looking for NE and the players’ beliefs which
lead to PBEs.
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